Cross-Border Mergers and Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment by Stepanok, Ignat
Cross-Border Mergers and
Green￿eld Foreign Direct Investment￿
Ignat Stepanoky
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 731
February 7, 2012
Abstract
I present a model of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), where
FDI is comprised of green￿eld FDI and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Working in
a monopolistically competitive environment, merging ￿rms do not reduce competition.
Mergers are motivated by e¢ ciency gains and transfer of technology and expertise. Fol-
lowing empirical evidence, I model green￿eld investors as the more productive group
relative to M&A ￿rms. The model has two symmetric countries and generates two-
way ￿ ows of both M&A and green￿eld FDI. Greater proximity to a market makes
more ￿rms choose green￿eld FDI over M&A when investing there. Empirical evidence
supports this result.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment, mergers, acquisitions, green￿eld, ￿rm het-
erogeneity.
JEL: F12; F23; O41.
1 Introduction
Most of the horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) literature describes FDI as the build-
ing of a production facility abroad (green￿eld FDI). It explores the trade-o⁄ between the
bene￿t of economies of scale of producing at home versus the bene￿t of producing abroad
and foregoing the payment of the variable costs of trade (e.g. transportation and tari⁄s).
The bulk of FDI actually belongs to M&A activity, over eighty percent in 1999 according
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1to UNCTAD (2000), or according to Head and Ries (2008) for the years between 1987 and
2001, two thirds of total FDI. According to Gugler et. al. (2003) for the period 1981-1998,
cross-border mergers as a share of all mergers were 10:6% in the US, 29:9% in the UK, 33:5%
in continental Europe, 52:6% in Japan, 30:0% in Australia, New Zealand and Canada and
28:5% in the rest of the world.
In order to study the e⁄ect of policy on FDI, it is important to properly model its com-
position and ￿rms￿incentives to chose a particular mode of entry into foreign markets. The
purpose of this paper is to model FDI not only as green￿eld investments but also M&A. In
the literature on FDI composition and trade, mergers are modeled in an oligopolistic setting
as in Neary (2009), where the incentive to merge is based on strategic motives (merging ￿rms
reduce competition), exploiting complementarities among merging parties (￿rm headquarters
with a speci￿c entrepreneurial ability and a production facility with a separate productivity)
in a monopolistically competitive market as in Nocke and Yeaple (2007) and (2008) or in
an oligopolistic market as in Norb￿ck and Persson (2007) and (2008). The current model
suggests a di⁄erent incentive for ￿rms to merge: transfer of technology and managerial ex-
pertise from the more productive ￿rm to the less productive one. There are three empirical
regularities related to FDI that the model ￿ts: ￿rst, green￿eld investors are more productive
than M&A ￿rms. Second, the model generates two-way ￿ ows of both M&A and green￿eld
FDI. Third, the closer are the two countries, the more green￿eld FDI is chosen over M&A
as a mode of entry.
I build an endogenous growth model with an expanding variety of products and ￿rms
with heterogeneous productivities. There are two symmetric economies Home and Foreign.
When a ￿rm is ￿ born￿it draws a marginal cost from an exogenous distribution. Depending
on how productive it turns out to be, it has several options to choose from: (i) to not enter
any market, (ii) to enter only its local market, (iii) to enter its local market and to export to
Foreign, (iv) to enter its local market and to merge with (take over) a ￿rm abroad, or (v) to
enter its local market and to invest in a new plant in Foreign that will allow it to produce its
product abroad. Each of those choices are optimal depending on where on the productivity
distribution a ￿rm is. I solve the model for an equilibrium where the least productive ￿rms
choose (i), the more productive choose (ii), ... and the most productive choose option (v).
This ordering is certainly not arbitrary. Empirical evidence shows that exporters are more
productive than non-exporters (see Bernard and Jensen (1999), Aw, Chung and Roberts
(2000) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998)), ￿rms engaging in FDI are in turn more
productive than exporting ￿rms (see Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005), Helpman (2006)) and
within the group of ￿rms choosing FDI as an option for entering the foreign market, the
more productive ones are involved in green￿eld FDI (see Nocke and Yeaple (2008)). The
ordering is also supported by Ra⁄ et. al. (2011) who look at Japanese ￿rm-level data.
In line with the theoretical literature on trade and ￿rms with heterogenous productivities
(in particular Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)), I connect the choice
to enter a market (both local and foreign) with a one-time payment of a ￿xed cost1. The
1See also Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008) for treatments of
the subject in endogenous growth settings.
2magnitude of the ￿xed costs determines the productivity necessary to enter or not and if yes
how (choices (i) through (v)). Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have in addition to the
usual ￿xed costs (for entering the local market and for exporting) a third one. This is the
￿xed cost for building a plant abroad. The innovative aspect of this paper is to introduce
one more ￿xed cost: for merging with a foreign ￿rm. Once the merger is completed, the
home investor can use the production facilities of the foreign ￿rm. A home ￿rm can therefore
enter the foreign market in one of three ways, by exporting, by merging with (acquiring) a
foreign ￿rm or by building a plant there.
The second innovative aspect of this model is how a merger is described. A home ￿rm
that chooses to acquire a foreign ￿rm will be able to use that foreign ￿rm￿ s production fa-
cilities. The key here is that the Home ￿rm￿ s higher productivity will partially ￿ transfer￿to
the foreign ￿rm. I write partially because the foreign plant￿ s productivity will be between
the productivities of the two ￿rms participating in the merger. When Renault took a third
ownership in Nissan in 1999, it installed one of its top managers, Carlos Ghosn, as Nissan￿ s
CEO. He restructured Nissan and brought it back to pro￿tability. It is this transfer of exper-
tise and technology that I model. According to Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) management
practices are an important source of ￿rm productivity, where ￿rms with better management
are more productive and larger. In addition, in a study of M&A activity in Canada and
the US around the time of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement from 1989,
Breinlich (2008) ￿nds that acquiring ￿rms are bigger, more productive and more pro￿table
in comparison to target ￿rms.
Firms are born and draw a marginal cost before they choose to enter any market. Home
￿rms acquire some of the failing foreign ￿rms that would otherwise not start production
due to too high marginal costs. After the foreign failing ￿rm is acquired, it obtains a new
productivity which depends on its productivity and that of the acquiring ￿rm. Therefore a
￿rm looking for a takeover target would prefer to merge with the most productive Foreign
failing ￿rm. I assume that the productivity of each ￿rm is not known. What is known is
only on which markets it is present or whether it is about to exit. A Home ￿rm looking for
a takeover target will pay the ￿xed cost for the merger and will be randomly assigned to one
within the group of exiting Foreign ￿rms. The bene￿t from the merger is split between the
acquiring and the target ￿rm.
Given this setup, I solve for a symmetric steady state equilibrium. I ￿nd in line with the
existing literature that lower variable costs to trade allow for more ￿rms to become exporters.
In my model there are two more productivity thresholds, one that separates exporters from
￿rms involved in M&A and the other the threshold dividing ￿rms involved in M&A and ￿rms
that open their own factory abroad (green￿eld FDI). Lower variable costs to trade make the
productivity threshold for both green￿eld FDI and M&A more stringent (less ￿rms choose
FDI as an option) and increase the share of green￿eld investment in total FDI.
The next section lays out the model. Section three gives a solution and section four
discusses the results. There is also an appendix where the more involving calculations are
spelled out.
32 The Model
In the model there are two symmetric economies (countries) Home and Foreign, a single
consumption good sector with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and a single innova-
tion sector where ￿rms invest in R&D to create knowledge. Labor is the single factor of
production and R&D. In each of the two economies, there is a ￿xed measure of households
that provide labor services in exchange for wage payments. Each individual member of a
household lives forever and is endowed with one unit of labor, which is inelastically sup-
plied. Total population and labor supply in a country at time t is Lt = L0ent, where L0 is
the initial population and n the population growth rate. There is no unemployment in the
economy. Firms invest in R&D to discover new varieties of products. This investment in
R&D represents a one-time product development ￿xed cost. After the ￿rm incurs that cost
and discovers a product, it draws its marginal cost from a given distribution.
To enter the Home and Foreign markets, there are certain exogenously given ￿xed costs
to be paid, all of them paid in terms of R&D labor. Every choice of entry is associated
with the payment of a ￿xed cost while exporters in addition face iceberg trade costs when
shipping goods to the foreign market. Instead of exporting, a ￿rm can choose to take over a
foreign ￿rm and use its production facilities. The bene￿t for the acquiring ￿rm is not only
to be able to gain a foothold for its product on the other market, but it also transfers part
of its productivity to the less productive foreign ￿rm. Lastly, some ￿rms choose instead of
exporting or taking over a foreign ￿rm to establish their own plant abroad.
2.1 Consumers
Households are in￿nitely lived and share identical preferences. Each household is modelled






where ￿ > n is the subjective discount rate and ut is the instantaneous utility of an individual











t is the measure of varieties available in the Home market, xt(!) is the amount
an individual consumes of a particular variety ! at time t and the degree of di⁄erentiation
between products is determined by ￿ 2 (0;1). Products are gross substitutes with an
elasticity of substitution ￿ ￿ 1=(1 ￿ ￿) > 1.













is an aggregate price index, ct is individual expenditure
and pt(!) is the price of product ! at t. Taking prices and expenditure as given the solution
to the intertemporal problem yields the familiar Euler equation _ ct=ct = rt ￿ ￿, where rt is
the market interest rate. I solve for a steady state equilibrium with a constant consumer
expenditure path, which is optimal only for rt = r = ￿ for all t.
2.2 Innovation
Firms create knowledge by doing R&D. A unit of knowledge requires bt units of labor for
its production. Firms treat bt as a parameter, but it changes with time due to knowledge
spillovers. Following Jones (1995b), I assume bt = 1=(mLt + ￿mFt)￿. The parameter ￿ < 1
measures the strength of intertemporal knowledge spillovers. The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1]
measures the strength of international knowledge spillovers, where ￿ = 0 corresponds to
no international spillovers and ￿ = 1 corresponds to perfect international spillovers. The
number of varieties developed and produced in Home (not including products resulting from
mergers or green￿eld FDI) is mLt and mFt is the number developed and produced in Foreign.







For ￿ > 0, researchers become more productive with time. For ￿ < 0, R&D becomes more
di¢ cult. I follow Jones (1995b) in choosing ￿ < 1 to rule out explosive growth. Taking logs
and di⁄erentiating with respect to time yields _ bt=bt = ￿￿ _ mt=mt
2.
To create a new product variety, a ￿rm needs to create FI units of knowledge which means
that it needs to invest btFI units of labor at time t. After the invention of a new variety,
the ￿rm draws a marginal cost parameter which indicates how many labor units it takes to
produce a unit of the good. This marginal cost parameter does not change over time and is





and a cumulative density function G(a) =
R a
0 g(a)da = (a=￿ a)k. Melitz (2003) works
with a general distribution. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) show that the model becomes
much more tractable if one chooses a Pareto distribution. The empirical literature on the
size distribution of ￿rms suggests that this is a reasonable choice (see Del Gatto, Giordano
and Ottaviano (2006)). The model will generate several types of marginal cost thresholds
which determine whether a ￿rm enters a market or not and if it does, how, by exporting,
acquiring a ￿rm abroad or by building a new plant. I use at some places throughout the text
productivity instead of marginal cost, keeping in mind that low marginal cost corresponds
to high productivity.
2The choice of R&D function yields an economic growth rate dependent on the population growth
parameter n, the elasticity of substitution ￿ and the R&D parameter ￿, thus making the model one of
semi-endogenous growth. Looking at US manufacturing industry data, Venturini (2010a,b) ￿nd that semi-
endogenous growth models have better empirical support than fully-endogenous growth models.
52.3 Producers
Given a particular marginal cost draw a(!) for producing the new variety !, a ￿rm makes




where pL is the price a ￿rm holding the patent for product variety ! sets on its local market
and xLt(!) is demand for that locally manufactured product. Using (1) and Ct ￿ ctLt as













where ￿ > 1 is an iceberg variable cost to trade and xEt(!) is demand for an exported
product !. Optimization yields pE(!) = ￿







I can express the relation between pro￿ts from selling on the local market and from exporting
as ￿Et = ￿￿Lt, where ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿. The case of autarky corresponds to ￿ = 0 and free trade to
￿ = 1.
2.4 Value Equations and Marginal Cost Cuto⁄s
There are four types of ￿rms. This ￿rst type is those that sell only at home, their value
will be denoted by vL(a). The second type is those that sell at home and export, with value
vL(a) + vE(a), where vE(a) is the value of the exporting section of a ￿rm￿ s operation. For
brevity I will suppress the time subscript in the value functions and pro￿ts. There also are
￿rms that sell at home and have merged with a foreign ￿rm. They have value vL(a)+vL(a0),
where a0 is the productivity of the foreign plant and is a function of the productivities of
the two merging ￿rms (a0 will be formally de￿ned shortly). The fourth type is those ￿rms
that sell at Home and have a subsidiary abroad. They have value 2vL(a), since they sell one
product on two markets without paying any variable costs to trade.
Looking at vL(a) ￿rst, I must have that the return on an equity claim in a ￿rm (pro￿ts
plus the change in its value for a short period dt) be equal to the riskless rate of return in the
economy r. There is no risk from investing in a ￿rm whose productivity is already known,





6where g ￿ _ vL=vL. The value equation for the exporting section of a ￿rm must satisfy






From (4), (5) and ￿Et = ￿￿Lt, one can see that vE(a) = ￿vL(a) and g ￿ _ vL=vL = _ vE=vE.
Let the value function from selling in the local market net of the ￿xed cost of entering
the local market be fL(a) ￿ vL(a) ￿ btFL. Let the marginal cost below which ￿rms ￿nd it
optimal to enter their local market be aL. Firms with marginal cost draws of a 2 (aL;
_
a)
will not be able to cover the ￿xed cost for entering the local market btFL and will therefore
not enter. The value of the ￿rm with the threshold marginal cost net of the ￿xed cost to
entering the local market must equal the value of a failing ￿rm for now written vF(aL):
fL(aL) = vF(aL):
2.4.1 Mergers and Acquisitions
An innovative aspect of my model is the M&A process and its bene￿ts. A more detailed
support for the M&A assumptions that I make is therefore necessary. The industrial or-
ganization literature has emphasized two main motives for a merger: e¢ ciency gains and
strategic motives. By strategic motives one has in mind reducing competition in a market
where ￿rms are not atomistic and a⁄ect the behavior of others. In my model with monop-
olistic competition, each ￿rm is in￿nitely small and its merger with another ￿rm does not
a⁄ect the behavior of other ￿rms. Without dismissing the importance of strategic interac-
tions between ￿rms in oligopolistic markets, I focus my attention on e¢ ciency gains through
transfer of knowledge and study this as one of the possible channels through which variable
costs to trade can a⁄ect the composition of FDI.
Here are the most important assumptions I make regarding the M&A process:
Assumption 1: The acquiring ￿rm pays a ￿xed cost to initiate a merger.
The ￿xed cost can be seen as a fee for a consultant to evaluate and facilitate the merger,
the cost of restructuring the foreign enterprise and facilitating its entry in the foreign market.
Assumption 2: The acquiring ￿rm can merge with a failing foreign ￿rm (the failing ￿rms
are those with a 2 (aL;
_
a))
A great number of ￿rm mergers in Eastern Europe in the 1990s for instance were nego-
tiated to save failing state enterprises. As part of a privatization process, the governments
were looking for foreign investors, which had the capability to increase those failing ￿rms￿
productivities and to save them from bankruptcy.3
Assumption 3: There are gains from a merger.
Jensen (1988) cites empirical evidence from the M&A literature, that takeovers ￿generate
substantial gains: historically, eight percent of the total value of both companies.￿
3The failing ￿rms can also be described as plants with low productivity that belong to larger ￿rms
consisting of several plants, each with its own unique productivity. In this case mergers could be seen as a
part of the process of ￿rms buying and selling corporate assets.
7Assumption 4: The gain from a merger comes from two sources i) the acquired ￿rm
obtains a lower marginal cost of production (e¢ ciency gains, can be seen as technology or
knowledge transfer between ￿rms) ii) the acquiring ￿rm gains a foothold in the foreign market
for its product and uses the acquired ￿rm￿ s production plant abroad. The foreign product for
which the foreign ￿rm has a patent is not produced.
According to Jensen (1988), empirical studies show that the gains from the merger rep-
resent ￿gains to economic e¢ ciency, not redistribution between various parties￿ . Mandelker
(1974) ￿nds evidence that mergers can be seen as a mechanism through which the market
replaces incompetent management, thus increasing e¢ ciency. Conyon et. al. (2002) ￿nd
that ￿rms that are acquired by foreign companies show an increase in labor productivity of
13%.
Turning to the theoretical literature, some papers focus on modeling e¢ ciency gains as
reductions in marginal cost for the post-merger ￿rm (see Werden (1996)). Roller et. al.
(2006) provide a useful discussion and summary of the theoretical literature on the role of
e¢ ciencies in M&A and how they are modeled. They talk about ￿ve di⁄erent sources of
e¢ ciency gains and say that all ￿ve can be modeled either as a reduction to variable or to
￿xed costs. The ￿rst source of gains is cost savings from reallocating production. There is
reallocation of production in my model in the sense that a home ￿rm gains a foothold in the
foreign market using the other ￿rm￿ s production facilities. Another source is economies of
scale. Roller et. al. (2006) further mention technological progress, modeled either as cost
reduction or product quality improvement. They speci￿cally mention di⁄usion of know-how
as a way to model technological progress. My approach ￿ts this description best, since I
have the less productive ￿rm ￿ learn￿from the more productive one. The last two channels
of e¢ ciency gains described in the theoretical literature are savings in factor prices such
as intermediate goods or the cost of capital (not present in my model) and reduction of
slack (managerial and X-e¢ ciency). My approach can ￿t the last one since the transfer of
productivity from the more e¢ cient to the less e¢ cient ￿rm can be seen as replacement of
incompetent management.
Assumption 5: The gain from the merger is split between the acquiring and the target
￿rm as a result of bargaining.
If the target ￿rm leaves the negotiation, it does not have the option to wait for another
match and exits immediately. If the acquiring ￿rm leaves the negotiation, it will not be
matched to another failing ￿rm. The outside options of both ￿rms are therefore zero. The
Nash solution to the bargaining problem assigns a share 0 <   < 1 of the gains from the
merger to the acquiring ￿rm and a share 1 ￿   to the target ￿rm, where the parameter  
represents the bargaining strength of the acquiring ￿rm.
When a ￿rm invests to merge with another ￿rm abroad, it will pay the ￿xed cost btFM,
where FM is the ￿xed cost for initiating a merger in terms of R&D units, and will be randomly
assigned to a ￿rm within that group. The precise productivity of the ￿rm with which the
acquiring ￿rm is matched is not known when the investment btFM is made. What is known
is whether the ￿rm is failing or not, and if not, on which market it sells. After the ￿xed
cost for initiating the merger has been paid and ￿rms have been matched, productivities are
revealed and the two ￿rms enter negotiations on how to split the proceeds from the merger.
8Let ah be the marginal cost of a home ￿rm and af 2 (aL;
_
a) that of the foreign failing
￿rm. In the equilibrium for which I solve and for which conditions are provided below, the
failing ￿rms are the ones with highest marginal costs, therefore ah < af. The restructured
foreign enterprise will have a marginal cost
a
0 ￿ (af=￿)ah;
where ￿ is the mean of the Pareto distribution.
This restructuring technology has the desirable property that a0 is an increasing function
of both af and ah. The higher is the marginal cost of the foreign failing ￿rm or of the home
acquiring enterprise, the higher is the marginal cost of the post-merger foreign plant. In
addition, the restructured plant will have a marginal cost in between the marginal costs of
the acquiring and acquired ￿rms, that is ah < a0 < af. To guarantee that this inequality
holds, I solve the model for a steady state equilibrium satisfying
aM < ￿ < aL: (6)
This implies that ￿ < af for all af, also ah < ￿ for all ah, from which follows that ah < a0 <
af.
Next, I de￿ne the net bene￿t of entering the foreign market in the three possible ways:
through exporting, acquiring a foreign ￿rm or building a plant abroad. The function fE(a) ￿
￿vL(a) ￿ btFE represents the value of exporting net of the ￿xed cost of entering the export
market. The function fG(a) ￿ vL(a)￿btFG represents the bene￿t of green￿eld FDI net of the
￿xed cost of building a plant abroad. The function fM(a) ￿  Ef [vL(a0)] ￿ btFM represents
the expected bene￿t of a merger net of the ￿xed cost for initiating the merger. In the
fM(a) function, the expectation takes into consideration that af, from the perspective of an
acquiring ￿rm, is a random draw from the truncated Pareto distribution with a probability
density function g(a)=(1 ￿ G(aL)). Remember that G(aL) is the probability that a ￿ aL,
so 1 ￿ G(aL) is the probability that a > aL and it is always the case that af > aL since
only failing ￿rms are acquired. Since a0 depends on both af and ah, I write the expectations
operator Ef in order to signify that expectations are taken with regard to af. Later in the
text when the expectation is taken with regard to ah, I will write Eh.






































and show that ￿ is a
function of aL and exogenous variables. I assume that k > ￿ ￿ 1 to make sure that ￿ is












I de￿ne ￿ ￿ Eh [(ah=￿)1￿￿]. The assumption k > ￿ ￿ 1 guarantees a positive ￿. I can
therefore write Eh [vL(a0)] = ￿vL(af).
All ￿rms that hold a patent before they draw a marginal cost at t have mass _ mt=G(aL).
Of those only 1 ￿ G(aL) fail to enter their local market. Therefore the mass of all failing






(takeover targets) is _ mt (1 ￿ G(aL))=G(aL).
The mass of all ￿rms discovering a product at t that have marginal cost within the range
a 2 (aG;aM) (looking for a takeover target) is _ mt (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))=G(aL). Therefore the
probability of being taken over is ￿ ￿
G(aM)￿G(aG)
1￿G(aL) .
The value of a failing ￿rm equals the likelihood with which that ￿rm will become a
takeover target times the share from the gains from a merger, times the expected gain:
vF(af) = (1 ￿  )￿Eh [vL(a
0)]
= (1 ￿  )￿￿vL(af):
In the appendix, I show that ￿￿ is a function of aL and exogenous variables.
In order to ￿nd aL I go back to fL(aL) = vL(aL) ￿ btFL = vF(aL). As is shown in the











Note that vL is proportional to a1￿￿. The functions fE, fM and fG are all de￿ned
as functions of a but when graphing these functions, it is convenient to think of them as
functions of a1￿￿, since they are all upward-sloping and linear in a1￿￿. In all three functions,
marginal cost a enters only through the term a1￿￿, which can be seen as a measure of
productivity (marginal cost raised to a negative power).
10Figure 1.
The functions fE, fM and fG are illustrated in Figure 1 and are drawn so that the ￿rms
with lowest marginal cost choose green￿eld FDI (a 2 (0;aG) or a
1￿￿
G < a1￿￿), ￿rms with
slightly higher marginal costs would rather acquire a foreign failing ￿rm (a 2 (aG;aM) or
a
1￿￿
M < a1￿￿ < a
1￿￿
G ) and the least productive of ￿rms entering the foreign market choose
to export (a 2 (aM;aE) or a
1￿￿
E < a1￿￿ < a
1￿￿
M ). This is not the only possible equilibrium
for which one can solve, but it is the one I am interested in, in order to ￿t the empirical
evidence on ￿rm productivity and preferable mode of entry into foreign markets cited in the
introduction. For the ordering of outcomes illustrated in Figure 1 to occur, I need to assume
that
FE < FM < FG: (8)
Also the slope of fG must be steeper than that of fM, which in turn must be steeper than
that of fE. For that to hold, I must have that
￿ <  ￿ < 1: (9)
The value of the foreign operation of an exporter with the cuto⁄ marginal cost for entering
the foreign market (denoted by aE) must be equal to the ￿xed cost that it needs to pay to
enter fE(aE) = ￿vL(aE) ￿ btFE = 0, as in Melitz (2003). Substituting for the value function











As illustrated in Figure 1, the value from entering through a merger is lower than from
entering as an exporter for less productive ￿rms (a1￿￿ < a
1￿￿
M ) but becomes preferable for
11more productive ￿rms (a1￿￿ > a
1￿￿
M ). I de￿ne aM to be the marginal cost threshold where
fE(aM) = fM(aM). I substitute into this expression for the value functions and for pro￿ts











A similar argument goes for determining the threshold marginal cost separating the ￿rms
that choose to enter with a merger from those that built their own plant abroad. For higher
marginal cost values ￿rms would prefer to enter by means of a merger, but the ￿rms with
lowest marginal cost ￿nd it more pro￿table to enter by green￿eld FDI. Let￿ s call aG the












The formal derivation of all marginal cost cuto⁄s is provided in the appendix. I solve for
an equilibrium where
0 < aG < aM < aE < aL <
_
a (13)
holds. As I show in the appendix, in addition to (8) and (9), the following conditions must
be satis￿ed for (13) to hold:
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1 ￿  ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿
: (16)
Condition (14) is similar to the one in Melitz (2003) ensuring that the more productive ￿rms
self-select into becoming exporters. At an intuitive level, it is reasonable to assume that a
￿rm needs to pay a higher ￿xed cost for entering a foreign market than for entering its local
market. Inequality (15) is more restrictive than FM > FE in (8). FM has to be su¢ ciently
larger than FE. This is a reasonable assumption, meaning that it is signi￿cantly more costly
to negotiate a merger than to enter the foreign market as an exporter. Condition (16) says
that FG has to be su¢ ciently larger than FM, or in other words, the cost to build a plant
abroad must be su¢ ciently higher than the cost of negotiating a merger.
There is one more constraint that I impose on the exogenous parameters in the model.
When I solve for the steady state equilibrium, I make sure that
0 < ￿ < 1 (17)
holds.
122.5 Innovation Incentives
To determine the incentive of ￿rms to develop varieties, the bene￿t of innovating a product
must be equal to the cost. The cost is FI R&D units times the labor required to produce
them bt. The expected bene￿t is a bit more involving to describe.
First, upon drawing an unfavorable marginal cost a > aL, the ￿rm becomes a takeover
target with a probability ￿ and gains a share 1￿  from the proceeds of the merger. Second,
given the ￿rm draws a marginal cost low enough to enter its local market a < aL, there is
the expected bene￿t of selling there after paying the ￿xed cost to enter btFL. Third, for a
marginal cost within the range a 2 (aM;aE), in addition to selling in its local market, the
￿rm pays a ￿xed cost btFE and starts exporting. Fourth, for a marginal cost within the
range a 2 (aG;aM), the ￿rm pays the ￿xed cost btFM and merges with a foreign failing ￿rm,
obtaining in the process a share   from the gains of the merger. Lastly, for a marginal cost
a 2 (0;aG), the ￿rm pays a ￿xed cost btFG and builds a plant abroad. The bene￿ts are





















The ￿rst integral represents the gain from a merger to a failing ￿rm times the probability of
such an event. The second integral shows the bene￿t from selling in the local market minus
costs for entering it. The third, fourth and ￿fth integrals describe the bene￿ts from entering
the foreign market (net of ￿xed costs) depending on the ￿rm￿ s chosen mode of entry. I group



















































This is the innovation incentives condition. The left-hand side of (19) can be seen as the
cost of developing a variety and the right-hand side as the bene￿t.
132.6 Solving for the Aggregate Price Index
















































where g(a)=G(aL) is the steady state density function conditional on entry. To explain the
price index I start with the ￿rst line. Those are the prices of all local originating ￿rms with
a productivity a 2 (0;aL). Foreign originating ￿rms with productivity a 2 (aM;aE) export
to home and sell at pE(a). Their contribution to the price index is on line two. Line three
describes the prices of all foreign ￿rms that have merged with a home failing ￿rm. Prices
charged by those ￿rms are based on a0. Line four describes the contribution to the price
index of foreign ￿rms that have a subsidiary at home. Substituting for prices, rearranging









2.7 Steady State Labor Market Clearing
Labor is inelastically supplied and mobile between sectors. All workers are employed either
in the R&D sector, a total of LIt, or in the production sector, a total of LPt. Total labor
supply can be expressed as Lt = LPt+LIt. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor and
receives a wage w = 1 per unit of labor supplied. Labor markets are perfectly competitive.
Total workforce in production is given by the sum of labor producing for the local market
and labor producing for the foreign market. For brevity, I write a(!)xLt(!) as axLt. To
produce a variety for the local market, a ￿rm needs axLt units of labor. To produce a variety
for the export market, a ￿rm needs ￿axEt units of labor. Let x0
t(!) be demand for a locally
produced product with marginal cost a0(!). I will for brevity write this demand as x0
t. Labor
involved in production at t is
LPt = mt

























The ￿rst integral expresses what is produced by all non-failing home originating ￿rms for the
local market. The second integral takes into consideration what is produced for exporting.
14The third integral takes into consideration what is produced by the formerly failing local
￿rms that were taken over by a foreign ￿rm. The fourth integral takes into consideration the
production of subsidiaries of foreign ￿rms. I substitute for xLt, xEt, x0





The full employment condition Lt = LPt + LIt implies that:




Aggregate income equals aggregate labor income Lt plus aggregate income from pro￿ts Ct=￿,
minus wages paid in the innovation sector LIt.
I move on to labor dedicated to R&D activities. The labor dedicated to discovering a
new product is btFI. The mass of ￿rms that discover a product at t is _ mt=G(aL). Total
R&D labor cost for product innovation at t is therefore _ mtbtFI=G(aL). Of all ￿rms that
have discovered a product, of mass _ mt=G(aL), only a fraction
R aL
0 g(a)da = G(aL) enter the
local market and are productive enough to pay btFL, hence the total R&D labor cost to
the economy from entering the local market is _ mtbtFLG(aL)=G(aL). Again, of all ￿rms that
have discovered a product only a fraction enter the foreign market and pay the btFE ￿xed
cost. This fraction is
R aE
aM g(a)da = G(aE) ￿ G(aM). Hence the cost paid by those ￿rms is
_ mtbtFE (G(aE) ￿ G(aM))=G(aL). A fraction (G(aM)￿G(aG)) of all ￿rms that have entered
pay the ￿xed cost to take over a foreign ￿rm _ mtbtFM(G(aM) ￿ G(aG))=G(aL). A fraction
G(aG) pay the ￿xed cost to invest in a foreign subsidiary _ mtbtFGG(aG)=G(aL). The total
amount of labor busy with R&D activities at time t is therefore:
LIt = _ mtbt
FI
G(aL)











From the de￿nition of Fx it follows that
LIt = _ mtbtFx: (22)
3 Solving the Model
I solve the model for a symmetric steady state equilibrium in which the endogenous variables
have constant growth rates. To ￿nd the growth rate of varieties, I de￿ne ￿ ￿ _ mt=mt. I









15Since ￿ is constant in steady state, LIt must grow at the same rate as m
1￿￿
t , so n = (1 ￿










Lt=mt. From (2), m
￿￿
t is a measure of absolute R&D di¢ culty. The greater m
￿￿
t is,
the more labor is needed to produce knowledge units. Combining pro￿ts from (3) with the
price index from (20) yields the following expression for pro￿ts ￿Lt = ￿￿1a1￿￿￿￿1ctLt=mt.
It is clear that the relevant market size for variety ! is Lt=mt. Firms are able to spread
their R&D costs over a larger market for a higher Lt=mt, therefore making R&D easier to




Lt=mt is R&D di¢ culty m
￿￿
t relative to the size of the
market Lt=mt. Log-di⁄erentiating yields _ zt=zt = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ n = 0. It follows that relative
R&D di¢ culty is constant in steady state, that is, zt = z for all t.
I proceed with ￿nding aL. I substitute in (7) for the price index from (20), for bt from











In the innovation incentives condition (19), I substitute for the the price index from (20),















L . I substitute for ￿ from (25) to obtain Fx =
￿q1(aL)FL
1￿(1￿ )￿￿ which is an
expression for Fx in exogenous parameters and aL. Further, from (18), substituting for the
cumulative distribution functions yields a second expression for Fx = q2(aL), where q2() is
a function of aL de￿ned in the appendix. Combining the two expressions for Fx gives an
equation, which I solve numerically to obtain a solution for aL:
q2(aL) = q1(aL)
￿FL
1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿
: (26)
I can treat aL as known from now on. Given aL, I know ￿ from (25), aE, aG and aM from
(7), (10), (11) and (12).
To ￿nd Ct using (21), I need to ￿rst ￿nd LIt and Ct=￿. I substitute for _ mt from (22) in
￿ ￿ _ mt=mt, for bt from (2) and for z ￿ m
1￿￿
t =Lt to arrive at an equation for R&D labor:
LIt =
FxzLt
(1 + ￿)￿￿: (27)
16In the innovation incentives condition (19), I substitute for the price index from (20), for bt
from (2) and rewrite m
1￿￿
t = zLt from the de￿nition of z to arrive at an expression for Ct=￿:
Ct
￿
= (r ￿ g)
FxzLt
(1 + ￿)￿: (28)
See the appendix for a detailed derivation. I substitute for LIt from (27) and for Ct=￿ from














Fx ((￿ ￿ 1)(r ￿ g) + ￿)
: (30)
This completes the solution of the model.
4 Results
Empirical evidence (Nocke and Yeaple (2008)) suggests that greater geographical proximity
increases the share of green￿eld investment in total FDI. In this section I show that for
plausible parameter values the model generates the same result. Geographical proximity can
be interpreted as lower transportation costs (lower ￿). I ￿rst ￿nd the share of green￿eld FDI
in total FDI. At every point in time ￿rms are born and make a decision about which markets
to enter and how. There is a constant ￿ ow of resources towards M&A and green￿eld activity.
The value of resources dedicated to M&A at t is btFM _ mt (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))=G(aL), where
(G(aM) ￿ G(aG))=G(aL) is the share of all local entrants _ mt engaged in M&A and btFM is
how much each ￿rm that invests pays for a merger. Similarly, the total value of green￿eld
FDI is btFG _ mtG(aG)=G(aL), where G(aG)=G(aL) is the share of all local entrants _ mt that
choose to build a plant abroad and btFG is the investment made by each of those ￿rms. The
share of green￿eld investment, denoted by ￿, is measured by green￿eld FDI value divided
by the sum of green￿eld FDI and M&A value:
￿ ￿
FGG(aG)
FGG(aG) + FM (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))
:
It will be useful to see what happens with total FDI as well. To measure that I add the
values of M&A and green￿eld FDI. Since I am interested only in the direction of change of
FDI as a result of lower variable costs to trade, I remove any multiplicative variables that
do not depend on ￿ and evaluate
z = z
FMG(aM) + (FG ￿ FM)G(aG)
G(aL)
:
17In addition, I look at the share of ￿rms that export, which is ￿ ￿ (G(aE) ￿ G(aM))=G(aL).
In my computer simulation, I use the following parameter values: ￿ = 0:04, ￿ = 0:714,
k = 3:735, n = 0:014, ￿ = 0:7189, ￿ = 0:7, ￿ a = 10, FI = 3, FL = 0:8, FE = 1, FM = 5,
FG = 60 and   = 0:9. The subjective discount rate ￿ is chosen so that the steady state
interest rate would match the long-term average in the data. The real interest rate in the
model is both the risk-free interest rate as well as a measure of the average real return on the
stock market. I set ￿ = 0:04 in accordance with McGrattan and Prescott (2005). The rate
of substitution between products is set at ￿ = 0:714. This choice results in an elasticity of
substitution of ￿ = 3:49, within the bounds of the estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006)
and a 40% markup, within range of the evidence presented in Basu (1996) and Norrbin
(1993). Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007) use data on exports and domestic sales by
French ￿rms and ￿nd that k=(￿ ￿ 1) = 1:5. To match this evidence, given my choice of ￿, I
set the parameter of the Pareto distribution at k = 3:735.
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have shown that each consumer￿ s instantaneous utility coincides
with their real consumption expenditure ut = Ct=PtLt. To measure economic growth, I
evaluate _ ut=ut. In ut = Ct=PtLt, I substitute for aggregate expenditure from (29), for the





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
:
I set the population growth rate parameter n = 0:014 to match the annual rate of world
population growth between 1991 and 2000 according to the World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2003). Given n, ￿ and the expression for _ ut=ut, I choose ￿ = 0:7189 to
guarantee that the steady state rate of economic growth is 2%, consistent with the average
GDP per capita growth rate in the US between 1950 and 1990 reported in Jones (2005).
The rate of international knowledge spillovers is assumed to be smaller than one, ￿ = 0:7.
The maximum marginal cost a ￿rm can draw, ￿ a, is a scale parameter and I set it equal to
10.4 Particular ￿xed cost values are chosen according to (14), (15), (16), (17), also making
sure that after solving for aL, I am left with aL < ￿ a and that (6) holds5. The ￿xed cost for
entering the local market FL is smaller than the one for entering the foreign market as an
exporter FE, which in turn is smaller than the ￿xed cost for initiating a merger FM. The
most expensive mode of entry abroad is by building a plant FG. I evaluate the model for a
change in ￿ from 1:9 to 1:5 (or ￿ changing from 0:20 to 0:36). At low values of ￿ there would
be no FDI and all ￿rms would prefer to export. To comply with ￿ <  ￿ < 1 (inequality (9)),
I can not choose very low values for   (the share of the M&A gains that go to the acquiring
4The speci￿c choice of ￿ a is not important for the results of the model. To be precise, ￿ ak is the scale
parameter. An increase in ￿ ak, accompanied by a proportionate increase in ￿xed costs would result in higher
marginal cost cuto⁄ values, but would not change variables like ￿, ￿ etc.




(￿ a=aL)k￿1 , k > 1 and (13) follows that 0 < ￿. What
remains to be checked when choosing ￿xed cost values is only ￿ < 1.
18￿rm). As long as (9) holds, the choice of   is not critical for the results. I set it at   = 0:9.
￿ aL aE aM aG z Fx ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ z
1:9 9:71 5:44 3:73 1:5532 1:38 4:43 0:0130 0:08 0:573 3:16 0:32 0:27
1:7 9:75 6:05 3:37 1:5496 1:39 4:39 0:0130 0:14 0:570 3:01 0:40 0:21
1:5 9:83 6:79 2:69 1:5400 1:41 4:33 0:0132 0:24 0:564 2:68 0:62 0:13
Table 1. The E⁄ects of Lower Variable Costs to Trade (￿ # )
The results from solving the model numerically are shown in Table 1. By looking at the
column for ￿ (percentage of ￿rms that export), one can see that the majority of ￿rms are
non-exporters in equilibrium. This is what Bernard et. al. (2003) ￿nd in their study of
200;000 US manufacturing plants, where only 21% report exporting. The share of green￿eld
investment in total FDI increases from 32% at ￿ = 1:9 to 62% at ￿ = 1:5. This share of
green￿eld FDI is consistent with data reported in Head and Ries (2008) (one third of total
FDI). The share of workers involved in all types of R&D activities, LIt=Lt, can be obtained





(￿ ￿ 1)(r ￿ g) + ￿
:
The ratio does not depend of variable costs to trade and given the choice of parameters, it
is LIt=Lt = 0:2083 or 20%.
Lower transportation costs (lower ￿) lead to a greater share of green￿eld FDI in total
FDI (higher ￿). The intuition is not immediately obvious. Lower variable costs to trade
make the exporting option more preferable. This is known in the literature as the proximity-
concentration trade-o⁄. The incentive to build or acquire a plant abroad decreases as it
becomes cheaper to export. Total FDI decreases (last column of Table 1). This decrease
happens at the expense of M&A activity. To better understand the forces at work, I spell
out aG and aM. From (7), (11) and (12), I obtain:
aG = aL
￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿






Contrary to Melitz (2003) lower variable costs to trade increase aL. The decision of a ￿rm to
enter or exit its local market is based not only on its ability to pay the entry ￿xed cost but
also on its exit value (becoming a takeover target), which equals the probability of a merger
times the expected gain. Lower ￿ leads to greater competitive pressures thus decreasing aL.
Lower ￿ leads to a lower ￿￿ which makes exit less attractive (more ￿rms want to enter the
local market), thus increasing aL. For the chosen parameter values the second channel is
stronger.
19Both aG and aM increase through aL, meaning that more ￿rms want to enter by means
of FDI. The second channel through which lower variable costs to trade a⁄ect the marginal
cost thresholds is ￿￿, the probability of being taken over times a measure of the expected
productivity of an acquiring ￿rm. Lower ￿ leads to lower ￿￿, thus decreasing both aM and aG.
The third channel through which geographical proximity a⁄ects the marginal cost thresholds
is ￿, a measure of the productivity of failing ￿rms. By making the most productive exiting
￿rms enter (increasing aL), lower variable costs to trade decreases the expected productivity
of failing ￿rms. Lower ￿ decreases the incentive for ￿rms to enter by means of M&A, thus
lowering aM and increasing aG. The fourth channel through which lower transportation
costs a⁄ect the marginal cost thresholds (in this case only aM) is by directly appearing in
aM through the ￿ term. Here we have the the proximity-concentration trade-o⁄ at play.
Exporting becomes more attractive6.
Given the chosen parameter values the second, third and fourth channels are stronger
than the ￿rst and lead to a lower aM, while the second channel is stronger than the ￿rst and
third and leads to a lower aG. The decrease in aM is greater than that in aG thus leading to
a higher share of green￿eld FDI in total FDI, ￿.
5 Conclusion
I develop a model of international trade and foreign direct investment, where FDI consists of
cross-border mergers and green￿eld FDI. I abstract from any strategic motives for a merger,
since I work with ￿rms in a monopolistically competitive environment. The incentive for
￿rms to merge comes from the transfer of technology and managerial know-how. Firms have
heterogeneous productivities and the model has steady state endogenous growth. Exporters
are more productive than non-exporters. Firms that engage in FDI are more productive than
exporters and within the group of FDI ￿rms, it is the most productive ones that become
green￿eld investors.
In addition to the unique approach to how M&A is modelled, the contribution of the
current setup is twofold: ￿rst, both green￿eld FDI and cross-border M&A exist simulta-
neously and go both ways from Home to Foreign and from Foreign to Home. This is not
present in Nocke and Yeaple (2008), which is the model closest to mine when it comes to the
results on FDI composition it generates. In their model of asymmetric countries, M&A ￿ ows
both ways. Green￿eld FDI however goes only from the richer to the poorer country, while
as income di⁄erences between the two countries become smaller, green￿eld FDI decreases.
Given their setup, there would be no green￿eld FDI between equally developed economies,
which is clearly at odds with the evidence.
Second, greater proximity to the foreign market increases the share of green￿eld FDI. In
order to generate this result , Nocke and Yeaple (2008) assume that the ￿xed cost for opening
up a factory abroad is lower, the smaller the distance to the foreign country. Given that
my model has iceberg trade costs (not present in Nocke and Yeaple (2008)), I believe that
6Abstracting from changes in aL, ￿￿ and ￿, ￿ #=) ￿ "=)  ￿ ￿ ￿ #=) FM￿FE
( ￿￿￿)FL "=) aM #.
20it generates that particular result in a more natural way, thinking of distance as a⁄ecting
variable rather than ￿xed costs.
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23Appendix
The Marginal Cost Cuto⁄s
In this section, I ￿nd the marginal cost cuto⁄s. To solve for aL I use from fL(aL) = vL(aL)￿
btFL = vF(aL):
vL(aL) ￿ btFL = (1 ￿  )￿￿vL(aL)
vL(aL)(1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿) = btFL
vL(aL) =
btFL
1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿









1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿
:











To solve for aE, I use fE(aE) = ￿vL(aE) ￿ btFE = 0 to obtain
￿vL(aE) = btFE:























To solve for aM, I use fM(aM) = fE(aM):
 ￿vL(aM) ￿ btFM = ￿vL(aM) ￿ btFE
24vL(aM) =
btFM ￿ btFE
 ￿ ￿ ￿
:





 ￿ ￿ ￿









 ￿ ￿ ￿
:











To solve for aG I use fG(aG) = fM(aG):
 ￿vL(aG) ￿ btFM = vL(aG) ￿ btFG
vL(aG) = bt
FG ￿ FM
1 ￿  ￿
:





1 ￿  ￿









1 ￿  ￿
:
















E , (7) and (10) imply that
FL









M , (10) and (11)
imply that
FM ￿ FE




I multiply both sides by the denominator (from (9), it follows that the denominator is
positive) to obtain:
(FM ￿ FE)￿ > ( ￿ ￿ ￿)FE
￿FM ￿ ￿FE >  ￿FE ￿ ￿FE;









G , (11) and (12) imply that
FG ￿ FM
1 ￿  ￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿
FM ￿ FE
> 1;




1 ￿  ￿



















From G(a) = (a=￿ a)k and G0(a) = g(a), I obtain g(a) = kak￿1=
_
a


































































where I assume that k ￿ ￿ + 1 > 0. Note that ￿ depends on aL.
26Finding ￿￿








































































￿ ak ￿ ak
L
k









￿ ak ￿ ak
L

















(￿ a=aL)k ￿ 1








1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿














1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿


























(￿ a=aL)k ￿ 1
This is an expression in exogenous variables, aL, ￿ which can be expressed in aL and exoge-
nous variables and ￿￿, thus showing that ￿￿ ultimately depends only on aL.


























































I group all ￿xed costs on the left-hand-side
btFI + btFLG(aL) + btFE(G(aE) ￿ G(aM))





























































(1 ￿  )￿Eh [vL(a


















= (1 ￿  )(G(aM) ￿ G(aG))Ef [Eh [vL(a
0)]]
= (1 ￿  )(G(aM) ￿ G(aG))Eh [Ef [vL(a
0)]]












=   (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))Eh [Ef [vL(a
0)]]
























































































































































































































































































































which is equation (20) in the main text.
Steady State Labor Market Clearing
I ￿rst calculate labor involved in production. Labor involved in production at t is
LPt = mt

























To produce a variety for the local market a ￿rm needs to use axLt labor units. Using (1) yields
axLt = apL(a)￿￿P
￿￿1
t Ct, where I have used aggregate consumption Ct = ctLt. I substitute
for the optimal price pL(a) = ￿





t Ct. For exporting,
a ￿rm produces with ￿axEt = ￿apE(a)￿￿P
￿￿1
t Ct labor units, where I use (1) to substitute
for demand. Substituting for pE(a) = ￿











t Ct, where I have used ￿ ￿ ￿1￿￿. The local ￿rms that were taken over
by a foreign ￿rm need a0x0




t Ct. I substitute for the optimal price pL(a0) = ￿
























































































































































The full employment condition Lt = LPt + LIt implies that Lt = ￿￿1
￿ Ct + LIt, which in
turn leads to equation (21) in the main text




To show that Ct=￿ is aggregate income from pro￿ts, I integrate over the pro￿ts of all

















































































































































































































Since ￿ is constant in steady state, LIt must grow at the same rate as m
1￿￿
t , so n =
(1 ￿ ￿) _ mt=mt, and therefore ￿ = n
1￿￿.


























33This is to show that the relevant market size for variety ! is Lt=mt.















































and substitute for z ￿ m
1￿￿




















which is equation (23) in the main text. In the innovation incentives condition (19), I







































34and for z ￿ m
1￿￿















































































The previous assumption that k > ￿ ￿ 1 guarantees that the integrals converge and ￿ is
￿nite. Lower values of k would result in explosive pro￿ts for marginal costs close to zero.






















































































































































1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿









1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿















1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿









1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿






I de￿ne ￿ ￿ k=(￿ ￿ 1) and write k￿￿+1
1￿￿ = 1 ￿ k
1￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿. I substitute for the above three































This is equation (25) in the main text where q1() is the expression in brackets and is a




















k + FL + FE
(aE=￿ a)














= FI (￿ a=aL)












= FI (￿ a=aL)














































1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿









1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿













1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿









1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿





I substitute for the above three ratios of the threshold marginal costs into the expression for
Fx to obtain
Fx = FI (￿ a=aL)
k + FL + FE
￿







1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿






1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿





37I rewrite the above as Fx = q2(), where q2() is the expression on the right-hand-side and is
a function of aL and exogenous variables only.
To ￿nd Ct using Ct = Lt + Ct





























(1 + ￿)￿ :
I use z ￿ m
1￿￿

































= btFx (r ￿ g)mt:




Fx (r ￿ g)
(1 + ￿)￿ m
1￿￿
t ;





= (r ￿ g)
FxzLt
(1 + ￿)￿:
This is equation (28) in the main text.
I substitute for LIt and Ct=￿ in (21) in order to solve for Ct




= Lt + (r ￿ g)
FxzLt












which is equation (29) in the main text.


















zFx (r ￿ g ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿)￿
￿
zFx(r ￿ g)￿ = (1 + ￿)
￿ + zFx (r ￿ g ￿ ￿)




Fx ((r ￿ g)￿ ￿ (r ￿ g) + ￿)
z =
(1 + ￿)￿
Fx ((￿ ￿ 1)(r ￿ g) + ￿)
;
which is equation (30) in the main text.
The share of green￿eld FDI, ￿, is measured by green￿eld FDI value divided by the sum
of green￿eld FDI and M&A value:
￿ =
btFG _ mtG(aG)=G(aL)
btFG _ mtG(aG)=G(aL) + btFM _ mt (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))=G(aL)
=
FGG(aG)
FGG(aG) + FM (G(aM) ￿ G(aG))
:
39To measure total FDI, I simply add the values of M&A and green￿eld FDI to obtain
z
0 ￿ bt _ mt
FMG(aM) + (FG ￿ FM)G(aG)
G(aL)
;












FMG(aM) + (FG ￿ FM)G(aG)
G(aL)
:
I am interested in the direction of change of FDI as a result of lower variable costs to trade.




￿Lt are all values not
a⁄ected by ￿.
To measure economic growth, I evaluate _ ut=ut. First, in ut = Ct=PtLt, I substitute for
































Instantaneous utility grows over time only because the number of varieties grows over time.





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
:
The share of workers involved in R&D activities, LIt=Lt, can be obtained from the equation

















(￿ ￿ 1)(r ￿ g) + ￿
:








1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿














1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿





1 ￿ (1 ￿  )￿￿
 ￿ ￿ ￿
FM ￿ FE
FL
￿ 1
1￿￿
:
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